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Forskningsenheden for analytisk erkendelsesteori, metafysik og kognitionsfilosofi

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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment

Many authors have found it plausible that practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open tomorrow, can depend not only on the person's evidence, but also on how important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open tomorrow. This thesis is known as "pragmatic encroachment" on knowledge and rational belief. Assuming that the thesis is true, I ask what explains it. I argue that a particular variant of instrumentalism about epistemic reasons offers a natural explanation.

Please contact Johanna Seibt for the Zoom link.