Abstract

In this talk I set out a model of anti-Humeanism that draws upon Platonic properties and a dynamic theory of time. The central idea of anti-Humeanism in the properties and laws debate is that there are necessary connections between distinct existences. In the model that I set out, this necessitation is understood in terms of a 'formal ontological command'. This posit is formal in the sense that it is understood as a way that kinds of beings stand to one another. E.J Lowe, for example, understands the instantiation relationship to be a formal ontological relationship, which is to say that it is not itself a material being (such as a substance or property), but rather a transcendental tie that holds between certain kinds of beings in virtue of their essences. My posit is formal in this sense, but it is distinctive in that its structure is non-relational. More specifically, its structure is based upon a command, which has a truth-evaluable test as its antecedent and a performable action as its consequent (as is the case with the imperative sentence "If it is raining, then put up your umbrella".) With this in mind, the basic setup of my model is that Platonic laws, construed as ordered relations, hold between different properties. The command checks to see whether or not a 'cause' property is instantiated by some object; if so, then the command executes its performable action, which is to introduce into the ontology a new object with the corresponding 'effect' property. Below is the basic scheme of the formal ontological command.

If at t₁ object x instantiates the first place of a Platonic relation, Then at t₂ introduce! object y such that y instantiates the second place of this Platonic relation.

I aim to understand this formal ontological command as a transcendental tie that holds between abstract Platonic universals and concrete objects in the context of a dynamic theory of time. In a nutshell, the idea is that we can view the concrete world as changing over time in such a way that it 'copies' relations that hold between properties in the abstract realm. I conclude my talk by outlining a couple of advantages that I take this version of 'dynamic Platonism' to enjoy over its rivals.

All are welcome!